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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the First Yaoundé Convention (1963-1969), the EU has been implementing its 
development policy in the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries. This paper focuses 
on the trade and aid flows between the EU and the ACP countries and attempts to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the EU’s development policy. It seems that the preferential trade arrangements 
between the EU and the ACP countries have neither substantially increased nor diversified trade 
between these two groups of countries. Additionally, although the EU has provided considerable 
amount of financial aid, the ACP countries continue to suffer from the lack of development-
enhancing political and judicial institutions. The most recent Cotonou Agreement intends to 
address the shortcomings of the economic cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries.  
 1. Introduction 
  The economic cooperation between the EU and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific 
countries (ACP) dates back to the Treaty of Rome that established the European Economic 
Community in 1957. The ACP countries, with a population of almost 600 million, have 
established a special relationship with the European Union through successive conventions or 
agreements (Table 1). In the early 1960s, this cooperation was formalized in Yaoundé 
Convention and has continued to the present day under different names. The latest is the Cotonou 
Agreement of 2000. Essentially, the economic cooperation between the ACP countries and the 
EU implies preferential trade agreements that are supposed to provide the ACP countries’ 
exports easier access to the EU, which is expected to promote growth in these countries. 
Additionally, the EU provides financial aid to the ACP countries in the form of grants and loans. 
This paper aims to quantify the effects of the economic cooperation between the ACP countries 
and the EU with respect to trade and aid. Has the economic cooperation improved the export 
performance of the ACP countries? Has it helped them to diversify their export structure? Has 
financial aid promoted economic development in the ACP countries? The paper is divided into 
five sections. Section 2 provides a historical overview on the ACP-EU relationship. Section 3 
examines the trade relations between the two groups of countries. Section 4 analyzes the 
effectiveness of financial aid to the ACP countries by examining selected governance-related 
variables. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. A Brief History of Economic Cooperation between the ACP countries and the EU 
  The economic cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries dates back to the 
Treaty of Rome that established the European Economic Community in 1957 (Figure 1). In this 
  2treaty, member countries expressed their commitment to the prosperity of their colonies and 
territories. These sentiments were formalized during the Yaoundé Convention and the treaty was 
signed in 1963 with 18 African ex-colonies that had recently gained independence. This treaty 
had a validity period of 5 years (1964-1969). A new one was signed in 1969 and went into effect 
in January 1971, this time with 20 African countries. The Second Yaoundé Convention (1971-
1975) initiated a much broader cooperation and led to the Lomé Convention of 1975 (Lomé I).
1
  71 ACP countries were the signatories of Lomé I. It provided a system of tariff 
preferences, which gave the ACP countries access to the European market. In addition, Lomé I 
introduced STABEX and SYSMIN schemes in the 1970s, which were special funds to promote 
earning stability in the ACP countries’ agricultural and mining exports, respectively. These 
schemes provided compensatory finance to the ACP states for adverse fluctuations in the world 
prices of key agricultural and mineral exports (McQueen, 1998). Preferential access based on a 
quota system was agreed for products, such as sugar and beef, which were in competition with 
the EC agriculture. Additionally, the EC committed ECU 3 billion for aid and investment to the 
ACP countries. The convention was renegotiated and renewed three times. In addition to 
continuing trade provisions, Lomé II (1981-1985) increased aid and investment expenditure to 
ECU 5.5 billion. Lomé III (1985-1990) further increased the aid commitments to ECU 8.5 
billion. Finally, Lomé IV (1990-1999) implied aid and investment commitments of ECU 12 
billion for the first five years. From Lomé I to Lomé IV, the ACP membership increased to 79 
countries. 
  The Lomé Agreement was succeeded by the Cotonou Agreement that was signed in 2000 
and is expected to remain in effect for 20 years. One of the relevant additions to the new 
                                                 
1 For more information on the EU’s free-trade agreements with other developing countries, see McQueen (2002) and 
Francois et al. (2005). 
 
  3agreement is the fact that the Lomé convention was extended to new concepts such as civil 
society, private sector, trade unions, governance issues, etc. The Cotonou Agreement focuses 
especially on the private sector as an instrument for sustainable economic development and 
envisions the inclusion of diverse civil groups in the planning and execution of national 
development strategies. The new agreement’s ultimate goal is to reduce and eventually eradicate 
poverty among the ACP countries. Therefore, the EU has made its trade and aid assistance 
conditional to the existence of human rights and good governance. The violation of these 
principles may lead to a partial or complete suspension of development cooperation between the 
EU and the country in question. Additionally, serious cases of corruption could lead to a 
consultation process and possibly a suspension of aid. The EU also states that cooperation 
agreements with individual countries will vary according to their level of development, needs, 
and performance as well as their long-term development strategy. 
  The most relevant change introduced by the Cotonou Agreement concerns trade 
cooperation. Since the First Lomé Convention in 1975, the EU has granted non-reciprocal trade 
preferences to their ACP partners. Under the Cotonou Agreement, however, this system will be 
replaced by a new scheme that will take effect in 2008: the Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs). These new arrangements provide reciprocal trade agreements, meaning that not only the 
EU provides duty-free access to its markets for ACP exports, but the ACP countries also provide 
duty-free access to their own markets for EU exports. However, all ACP countries do not have to 
open their markets to EU products after 2008. Least developed countries (LDCs) will be 
protected by the arrangements made in Lomé agreements, which gives them the opportunity to 
exercise greater control of EU imports. Non-LDCs, on the other hand, will see their trade 
situation transferred into the EU’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). 
  4  Criticism of preferential trade arrangements (PTAs) mainly states that they are simply 
reductions on the tariff level. Some argue that these agreements mainly promote international 
goodwill and political harmony between the EU and its former colonies without providing 
significant economic gains to the latter (McQueen, 1982). There may be several reasons for the 
rather ineffective nature of PTAs. First, because the level of relevant tariffs is generally low, 
PTAs' significance is highly questionable. Second, if introduced, non-tariff barriers could 
eliminate PTAs’ positive effects. Third, developing countries’ export performance may be 
shaped to a large extent internally, depending upon their development strategies (inward- or 
outward-looking strategies) and exchange rate policies so that PTAs would not make a 
significance contribution. On a more positive note, PTAs may foster outward-looking 
development strategies.  
 
3. Empirical Evaluation of ACP-EU Trade Relations   
  All products originating in the ACP countries are imported into the Community “free of 
custom duties and charges having equivalent effect” (Article 168.1) and “the Community shall 
not apply to imports of products originating in the ACP States any quantitative restrictions of 
measures having equivalent effects (Article 169.1). The only exception to this legally binding 
guarantee of free entry concerns products subject to the restrictions of the common agricultural 
policy (CAP). In addition to agricultural products, the EU has consistently limited preferential 
access for sensitive products such as textiles and clothing as well steel. Nevertheless, the ACP 
countries have had access to substantial trade benefits since Lomé I through exemptions from 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers such as Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) quotas (as long as textile 
exports comply with the EU’s rules of origin), concessions on products covered by the CAP, and 
  5concessions on the rules of origin (McQueen, 1998). Therefore, the question is whether the 
provision of PTAs to the ACP countries has substantially increased the ACP-EU trade. To this 
end, we will examine three subjects: export expansion effect, export diversification effect, and 
terms of trade.  
 
Export expansion effect 
  First, let us examine the significance of trade between these two country groups during 
the period 1970-1997. From the EU’s perspective, about 60 percent of the EU’s trade takes place 
among the EU countries (Figure 2). While the EU’s trade with non-oil developing countries 
increased from 15 to 19 percent, the relevance of oil-exporting countries in the EU’s trade 
declined from 14 percent during the early 1970s to less than 3 percent in 1997. Similarly, the 
ACP countries’ relevance in the EU trade has been declining from almost 8 percent to under 3 
percent (Figure 3). From the ACP country’s perspective, there is a decline in the relevance of the 
EU in the ACP countries’ trade from over 8 percent to 6 percent. One would expect that the EU’s 
preferential trade arrangement provided an incentive to strengthen the trade ties with the ACP 
countries. However, a simple graphical analysis does not confirm this expectation. In the 
following, we conduct a more formal test on this issue.  
  By employing the Index of Standardized Trade Performance (ISTP), one can compare the 
ACP countries’ export and import performance with respect to the EU with that of other non-oil 
developing countries. While the ACP countries are regarded as the beneficiary countries, the 
non-oil developing countries will be viewed as non-beneficiary or reference countries. The ISTP 
for exports and imports is implied by the following formulae: 
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where: 
ISTPX, M: Index of standardized export (X) or import (M) performance 
X, M: rate of change in exports or imports  
B: Beneficiary countries (ACP) 
N: Non-beneficiary countries (reference countries: non-oil exporting developing countries) 
G: Preference-granting country or trading block (EU) 
R: Rest of the world  
 
  An ISTP greater than 1 indicates a significant expansionary impact on the exports or 
imports of the beneficiary countries. As Figures 4, 5, and 6 suggest, trade expansion has 
remained well under 1. Additionally, exports and imports of the ACP countries to and from the 
EU have been fairly stable relative to non-oil exporting developing countries during the time of 
Yaoundé and Lomé conventions, despite the fact that the ACP countries supposedly enjoyed 
better access to the EU (XBG/XNG and MBG/MNG in Figures 4 and 5). Also, compared to non-oil 
exporting developing countries, the ACP countries’ exports and imports to and from the rest of 
the world have declined significantly since 1970 (XBR/XNR and MBR/MNR in Figures 4 and 5). 
Therefore, the export and import expansion effects shown in Figure 6 do not actually imply an 
  7improvement in the ACP countries ability to trade with the EU after 1980. The decline in these 
countries’ trade with the rest of the world gives the impression that its trade with the EU has 
somewhat improved. Figure 7 provides the same information on the basis of individual ACP 
countries. With the exception of Botswana, Djibouti, the Gambia, Grenada, Kiribati, Lesotho, 
Namibia, Samoa, Seychelles, Swaziland, and Tonga, the expansion in trade with the EU has 
remained modest.   
   
Trade diversification effect 
  In addition to the change in exports and imports, one can also ask the question whether 
PTAs provided by the EU have initiated diversification in the ACP countries’ exports, which 
would be an important consideration with respect to these countries’ economic development. 
One obvious obstacle against diversification would be the “rules of origin,” which involves 
minimum levels of domestic value added, usually 60 percent, and process criteria such as “yarn 
forward” rule which requires vertically integrated chains of production for industrial good. The 
EU seeks to mitigate the restrictive effects of the rules of origin by allowing a partner country to 
count imports of intermediate products from the EU used in production as “originating products” 
(bilateral accumulation). The EU, however, may not supply such products or may not be the 
most efficient source of supply, which could lead to trade diversion and make the partner country 
less competitive in the EU market (McQueen, 2002). Some studies argue that the rules of origin 
have the effect of protecting the EU industries from potential competition of ACP manufacturers. 
The EU insists that the same rules of origin must apply to all its preferential trade agreements 
and that special rules for the ACP states would be costly to implement (McQueen, 1982).  
  8  Three panels of Figure 8 show the changes in mean diversification and concentration of 
the ACP countries’ trade. Panel A implies that the mean number of export and import goods has 
not changed substantially over the years, although there has been an increase especially in the 
number of export goods. Panel B shows the mean diversification in the ACP countries’ exports 
and imports. Clearly, exports are more diversified than imports. Additionally, there has been a 
slightly increasing trend in both. However, there has been no significant improvement especially 
with respect to diversification in the ACP countries’ exports.     
 
Terms of Trade 
  The net barter terms of trade (NBTT), the ratio of the export unit value index to the 
import unit value index, is often used to determine whether foreign trade increases or reduces a 
country’s welfare. While a rise in the NBTT is associated with an increase in a country’s welfare, 
a decline has been considered as a reduction in its welfare. Since the pioneering research by 
Prebish (1950) and Singer (1950), which projected a worsening NBTT for primary products with 
respect to manufactured goods, many advocates of unequal trade have used the term “worsening 
NBTT” to point out the structural asymmetries in trade between developed and developing 
countries. However, Baldwin (1955) questioned the validity of the NBTT in studying the 
distribution of gains from trade. According to their view, it is possible that a developing 
country’s NBTT may worsen because of the fact that increased productivity has led to a decline 
in cost and, therefore, to a decline in export prices. One can argue that the country is better off 
with a worsening NBTT caused by an increase in productivity, because the country is now able 
to allocate its scarce resources more efficiently.  
  9  Figure 9 compares the NBTT for three country groups: the ACP, developing, and oil-
exporting countries. During the period 1980-2004, following a decline in the early 1980s, 
developing countries have managed to keep their NBTT fairly steady. Oil-exporting countries, 
on the other hand, experienced an increase in their NBTT during the early 1980s, followed by a 
decline until 2000. The NBTT has been rising for the oil-exporting countries since 2000. The 
ACP countries, however, has experienced a declining NBTT since 1985. As we will see in the 
next section, it is not likely that the decline in the ACP countries’ NBTT is due to increased 
productivity.     
 
4. The EU’s Financial Aid to the ACP Countries  
  The Treaty of Rome (1957) provided for the creation of the European Development Fund 
(EDF) to grant technical and financial assistance initially to African countries, which at that time 
were still colonies or with which some European member states had historical links. The EDF is 
funded by the member states of the EU and is managed by a specific committee. The aid granted 
to the ACP countries will continue to be funded by the EDF, at least for the period 2008-2013. 
Each EDF is concluded for a period of around five years. Since the conclusion of the first 
partnership convention in 1964, the EDF cycles have generally followed the convention cycles 
shown in Figure 1:  
♦  First EDF: 1959-1964  
♦  Second EDF: 1964-1970 (Yaoundé I Convention)  
♦  Third EDF: 1970-1975 (Yaoundé II Convention)  
♦  Fourth EDF: 1975-1980 (Lomé I Convention)  
♦  Fifth EDF: 1980-1985 (Lomé II Convention)  
♦  Sixth EDF: 1985-1990 (Lomé III Convention)  
♦  Seventh EDF: 1990-1995 (Lomé IV Convention)  
♦  Eighth EDF: 1995-2000 (Lomé IV Convention and the revised Lomé IV)  
♦  Ninth EDF: 2000-2007 (Cotonou Agreement)  
♦  Tenth EDF: 2008-2013 (Revised Cotonou Agreement)  
  
  10  The EDF consists of several instruments, including grants and loans to the private sectors 
of the ACP countries. The STABEX and SYSMIN schemes that were designed to help the 
agricultural and mining sectors were abolished by the new partnership agreement signed in 
Cotonou in 2000. The Cotonou agreement also streamlined the EDF to increase its flexibility and 
give the ACP countries greater responsibility. The ninth EDF has allocated €13.5 billion for the 
period 2000-2007. In addition, the unexpended balances from previous EDFs amount to €9.9 
billion. The ACP-EC Council of Ministers Decision in 2005 committed €482 million of the 
conditional €1 billion to the ninth EDF. Moreover, the European Investment Bank (EIB) will 
contribute a total of €1.7 billion from own resources for the period covered by the ninth EDF. 
  Additionally, the ACP-EU Council of Ministers decided on exceptional aid for highly-
indebted ACP countries in December 1999, which falls into the greater framework of the 
international debt-relief initiative for highly-indebted poor countries (HIPC initiative) approved 
at the G7 summit in Cologne in the summer of 1999. Unallocated resources from the eighth EDF 
may be used in the form of grants to meet outstanding debt and debt-servicing obligations to the 
Community of the ACP countries that qualify under the HIPC initiative (€320 million); 
contributing to the overall financing of the HIPC initiative by providing up to €680 million for 
the HIPC Trust Fund managed by the World Bank.   
    In the framework of the EU's external cooperation and development policies, the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) operates in 79 ACP countries. The EIB has been the 
development bank of the European Union and active in many ACP countries for 30 or 40 years 
(McQueen, 1998).
2 The Cotonou Agreement mandates the EIB to provide reimbursable aid to 
                                                 
2 The EIB also supports investment in 20 Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT), mainly in the Caribbean and 
the Pacific, which have constitutional links with some of the EU members.  
 
  11projects, alongside grant aid from the European Commission. In 2003-2008, the EIB is expected 
to channel €3.7 billion to ACP projects. 
  Regarding the funds distributed by the EU to the ACP countries, a consistent and 
comprehensive dataset does not exist. The fact that the EDF was not included in the EU's general 
budget may explain the lack of data. The EDF has been the only expenditure that is not subject to 
authorization by the European Parliament. Following the request by the European Parliament in 
1993, the EDF-related grants and loans have since been included in the EU budget. In 2003, the 
European Commission recommended the incorporation of financial aid to the ACP countries as 
well as Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) in the framework of the EDF and into the EU 
budget. Incorporating the EDF into the budget is expected to strengthen the public legitimacy of 
the EU's external assistance. In its recommendation to the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament, the European Commission stated that this change would allow increased public 
control of the EU aid and greater transparency as well as effectiveness associated with it. 
Additionally, the financing of EU-ACP cooperation would gain independence from voluntary 
contributions determined as a result of national viewpoints and bring financial cooperation with 
the ACP countries up to the EU level. However, a disadvantage of the new budget rule may lie in 
the fact that the negotiations regarding the EU’s financial aid to developing countries will not get 
any easier with the increasing number of new EU-members, whose income levels are in the 
lower range.  
  In the absence of the EU-provided data, we gather borrowing data on 65 out of 79 ACP 
countries from Global Development Finance CD-ROM of 2000 published by the World Bank.  
The period in question is 1970-1998 and Table 3 examines some of the borrowing-related 
variables. Clearly, the ACP countries are among the world’s poorest countries. The average ACP 
  12GDP per capita is about 6 percent of the U.S. GDP. When only African countries are considered, 
this ratio declines to almost 4.5 percent. With respect to the type disbursement, grants have a 
higher share in ACP countries (over 40 percent).  In terms of the size of funds, for example, the 
average annual grant disbursement to an ACP country is about $77 million. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that significant amounts of funds are provided to the ACP countries.    
  The Cotonou Agreement has been criticized for moving from partnership to imposition of 
excessive and unhelpful conditionality upon the ACP countries. This agreement introduces the 
idea of performance-based partnership and abandons "aid entitlements" (i.e., fixed allocations of 
funds regardless of performance). Under the new agreement, the EU can be more selective and 
flexible in the way it allocates development resources. Aid allocations will be based on an 
assessment of each country’s needs and performance, which will include the possibility of 
regular adjustments in the light of this assessment. In practice, it means that more money can be 
channeled to "good performers" and that the share of "bad performers" can be reduced.  
  Clearly, the ACP countries are in need of performance-related financial aid, because they 
score very poorly on governance-related variables. Using the data on 72 out of 79 ACP countries 
provided by the International Country Risk Guide of 2004 by the PRS Group during the period 
1970-2004, one can verify this claim. Table 4 summarizes the ACP countries’ scores in 
corruption (0-6), bureaucratic quality (0-4), law and order (0-6), democratic accountability (0-6), 
and internal conflict (0-12). These variables are measured by index numbers indicated in 
parentheses. Only for corruption, higher values imply lower corruption. Table 4 indicates that the 
ACP countries have high levels of corruption, low bureaucratic quality, weak judicial institutions 
and democratic accountability, and high levels of internal conflicts. These issues probably 
constitute the very reason as to why the ACP countries have not made a better use of the 
  13preferential trade concessions and financial aid provided by the EU. While crippling 
conditionality is clearly not desirable, under the circumstances, the Cotonou Agreement’s 
emphasis on good governance seems to be warranted.     
 
5. Conclusion 
  This paper attempts to quantify the effectiveness of the economic cooperation between 
the EU and the ACP countries. The methods employed are quite descriptive in nature and more 
empirical analysis is necessary. The preliminary results suggest that neither preferential trade 
arrangements nor financial aid provided to the ACP countries by the EU has made a significant 
difference in the economic and governance-related performance of these countries. Hopefully, 
the Cotonou Agreement’s focus on the domestic dynamics of the ACP countries will make a 
positive difference in the years to come.  
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  15Table 1: ACP countries  
 
African   Caribbean   Pacific 
1.  Angola  
2.  Benin  
3.  Botswana  
4.  Burkina Faso  
5.  Burundi  
6.  Cameroon  
7.  Cape Verde  
8.  Central African Republic  
9.  Chad  
10.  Comoros  
11.  Congo-Brazzaville  
12.  Congo-Kinshasa  
13.  Côte d'Ivoire  
14.  Djibouti  
15.  Equatorial Guinea  
16.  Eritrea    
17.  Ethiopia  
18.  Gabon  
19.  Gambia  
20.  Ghana  
21.  Guinea  
22.  Guinea-Bissau  
23.  Kenya  
24.  Lesotho  
25.  Liberia  
26.  Madagascar  
27.  Malawi  
28.  Mali  
29.  Mauritania  
30.  Mauritius  
31.  Mozambique  
32.  Namibia    
33.  Niger  
34.  Nigeria  
35.  Rwanda  
36.  São Tomé and Príncipe 
37.  Senegal  
38.  Seychelles  
39.  Sierra Leone  
40.  Somalia  
41.  South Africa  
42.  Sudan  
43.  Swaziland  
44.  Tanzania  
45.  Togo  
46.  Uganda  
47.  Zambia  
48.  Zimbabwe  
 
49.  Antigua and Barbuda  
50.  Bahamas  
51.  Barbados  
52.  Belize  
53.  Cuba  
54.  Dominica  
55.  Dominican Republic  
56.  Grenada    
57.  Guyana  
58.  Haiti  
59.  Jamaica  
60.  Saint Kitts and Nevis  
61.  Saint Lucia  
62.  Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  
63.  Suriname  
64.  Trinidad and Tobago  
  
 
65.  Cook Islands  
66.  Fiji  
67.  Kiribati  
68.  Marshall Islands  
69.  Micronesia  
70.  Timor-Leste  
71.  Niue     
72.  Palau  
73.  Papua New Guinea  
74.  Nauru 
75.  Samoa 
76.  Solomon Islands  
77.  Tonga  
78.  Tuvalu  
79.  Vanuatu  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  16Table 2: Mean trade diversification and concentration in the ACP countries and other country groups  
 
 
  Regions 
# of  
export 
goods 
# of  
import 
goods 
Export 
diversification 
Import 
diversification 
Export  
concentration 
Import 
concentration 
ACP countries 
 
49  146  .52 .41 .51 .14 
Developing countries in  
 
Latin America 
 
189  215  .54 .34 .25 .11 
Asia 
 
205  225  .54 .38 .25 .12 
Income levels 
 
High 
 
202  225  .53 .36 .28 .11 
Middle 
 
184  218  .57 .37 .28 .12 
Low 
 
181  214  .55 .42 .25 .11 
 
Source: Handbook of Statistics CD-ROM of 2005 by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  17Table 3: Borrowing by the ACP countries 
 
 
 
ACP   Africa  Caribbean  Pacific 
Income level 
GDP per capita as 
percentage of U.S. 
GDP per capita 
6.12      4.47      10.45      7.51     
Sources of funds as percentage of total disbursements 
Multilateral 
 
14.11 16.24  10.79  5.93 
Grants 
 
40.35 42.85  26.86  53.07 
Bilateral 
 
17.21 19.12  16.14  5.31 
FDI 
 
12.72 7.69  26.41  18.53 
Size of funds (in millions of US dollars) 
Multilateral 
 
43.85      54.99      21.63      12.11     
Grants 
 
77.01 97.89  22.14  48.51 
Bilateral 
 
36.77 45.92  20.54  6.06 
FDI 
 
34.35 35.41  35.96  22.54 
 
Source: Global Development Finance CD-ROM 2000 by the World Bank  
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Table 4: Governance-related performance in ACP countries 
 
 
 
ACP   Africa  Caribbean  Pacific 
Corruption  
 
2.51 2.53 2.36 2.67 
Bureaucratic quality 
 
1.45 1.39 1.59 2.62 
Law and order 
 
2.71 2.72 2.59 3.05 
Democratic accountability 
 
2.83 2.67 3.41 4.48 
Internal conflict 
 
7.28 7.15 7.73 8.64 
 
Source: International Country Risk Guide of 2004 by the PRS Group 
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Figure 1:  Timetable of the ACP-EU Cooperation 
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  22Figure 4 – A: Components of export expansion effect 
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Figure 5 – B: Import expansion effect 
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  25Figure 7: Mean changes in the individual ACP countries’ trade with the EU (1970-1997) 
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  26B. Caribbean Countries 
 
C. Pacific Countries 
-100 0 100 200 300 
  Trinidad & Tobago 
Suriname
    St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
St. Lucia
 St. Kitts and Nevis 
  Sao Tome and Principe 
Jamaica
Haiti
Guyana
Grenada
  Dominican Republic 
Dominica
Cuba 
Belize
Barbados
Bahamas
 Antigua and Barbuda
Mean change in 
imports from EU
 
Mean change in 
Exports to EU 
 
-100  0 100 200 300 
Vanuatu
Tuvalu
       Solomon Islands 
Samoa
  Papua New Guinea 
Nauru
Kiribati 
    Fiji 
         Comoros 
Mean change in 
imports from EU
Mean change in 
exports to EU 
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  27Figure 8: Diversification effects 
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  288 – B: Mean export and import diversification 
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  298 – C: Mean export and import concentration 
 
Source: Handbook of Statistics CD-ROM of 2005 by the United Nations 
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  30Figure 9: Terms of Trade (2000 = 100)  
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators CD-ROM of 2006 by the World Bank  
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